The Upshot
“The proliferation of dollar stablecoins - rendered possible by the ubiquity of smartphones and the cryptography of blockchains - could become the greatest experiment in financial empowerment humanity has ever undertaken.”
-Ritchie Torres
The Problem
Today's payment landscape, not so efficient. In 2023, the global payments industry processed 3.4 trillion transactions, generating $2.4 trillion in revenue while handling $1.8 quadrillion in value. The cost of this system falls heavily on businesses:
- When customers spend $2 on coffee, the shop only gets $1.70-$1.80 while card companies take ~15% ($0.20-$0.30) just to process the payment
- Walmart's $648B annual revenue yields $15.5B in profit, while paying about $10B (1.5%) in credit card processing fees
- Of Stripe's 2.9% + $0.30 fee per transaction, over 70% goes to Visa and the issuing bank, with Stripe keeping less than 30%
- Sending $200 from US to Colombia costs less than $0.01 using stablecoins, compared to $12.13 through traditional money transfer services
- Kroger's entire profit margin (below 2%) is less than credit card processing fees
- Chipotle pays $148M in credit card fees on $1.2B annual profit
The Solution
While traditional card payments bounce through 6 different companies taking fees over 1-3 days, stablecoins work like handing someone cash over the internet - direct, near-instant transfers for less than a penny.
Credit Card Payment
1-3 days
$0.29
14.5%
- Coffee Consumer
- Point of Sale
- Payment Processor
- Acquiring Bank
- Card Network
- Issuing Bank
- Merchant Account
- Coffee Shop
Stablecoin Payment
~1 minute
$0.002
0.1%
- Coffee Consumer
- Point of Sale
- Blockchain
- Merchant Wallet
- Coffee Shop
Stablecoins are cheaper, faster money by cutting out the middleman.
Some Social Proof
- Stripe acquired Bridge.xyz for $1B
- Stablecoins already have 28.5M unique users making 600M transactions a month
- Stablecoin volume hit $8.5T in Q2 2024, 32% of crypto transaction volume
- Layer 2 solutions have reduced transaction costs from $12 to under $0.01 USDC
Adoption Flywheel
Three drivers create a feedback loop accelerating stablecoin adoption:
-
Businesses can cut back-office costs on payroll, subscriptions, and invoices without major changes to existing processes, because stablecoin orchestration is integrated into payment processors like Stripe. These savings cascade to consumers through structurally cheaper products as adoption scales.
-
Onramps like Venmo, Paypal, and Revolut make onboarding easier for users, and fiat-backed issuers like Circle, Paypal, and Tether share profits with businesses. This model mirrors how Visa shares fees with partners, enabling businesses to earn yield on stablecoin flows.
-
Frameworks like the EU's MiCA regulation provide clear guidance, increasing confidence in stablecoins. MiCA has already reshaped the European stablecoin market. In the U.S., bipartisan interest in legislation focuses on ensuring stablecoin issuers maintain high-quality reserves and meet compliance standards.
Feedback Loop
- Lower costs (1) incentivize businesses to adopt
- Shared profits and easy onboarding (2) attract users and businesses
- Regulatory clarity (3) reinforces trust, validating stablecoins as reliable solutions
- So each new participant strengthens the ecosystem, compounding adoption
Banks and Stablecoins
Historical Milestones
From the First Bank to USDC, financial systems tackle trust and scale. The timelines show how stablecoins compress centuries of banking evolution into years.
Traditional Banking1791-2020
Stablecoins2017-2024
Traditional banking, 1791-1811
First Bank of the United States
First centralized authority for standardizing national currency redemption (Americas Bank)
Traditional banking, 1816-1836
Second Bank
Expanded standardized bearer instruments for national trade
Traditional banking, 1837-1863
Free Banking Era
Multiple private banknotes with varying trust and redemption values
Stablecoins, 2021
Fiat-backed stablecoins
Regular attestations and redemption guarantees established
Stablecoins, 2021
Asset-backed stablecoins
Transparent collateral and liquidation protocols mature
Traditional banking, 1913
Federal Reserve Act
Created fractional reserve banking enabling money creation through lending
Stablecoins, 2023
SEC enforcement
Regulation of synthetic dollar products begins (TrustToken Inc. and TrueCoin LLC)
Traditional banking, 1971
End of Gold Standard
Transitioned to pure fiat currency system for money creation
Stablecoins, 2024
Market Dominance
Fiat-backed stablecoins reach 94% of total supply
Traditional banking, 2008
Volcker Rule
Separated retail banking from speculative investment to reduce systemic risk
Stablecoins, Future
Lending Evolution
Decentralized protocols expand money supply capabilities
Traditional banking, 2020
Zero Reserve Requirements
Maximized fractional reserve lending flexibility under regulation
Stablecoins, Future
Full Maturity
Stablecoins establish robust regulatory and technical standards
I'd say the main takeaway here is that: Stablecoins built-in transparency (auditable reserves, visible collateral) enables faster evolution of lending products compared to traditional banking. You can copy what worked in banking, paste it into stablecoins.
Types of Stablecoins
Stablecoins come in three main flavours: 1) Fiat-backed 2) Asset-backed 3) Synthetic dollars.
- Fiat-backed stablecoins dominate the market ($150B, 94% share), led by Circle (USDC) and Tether (USDT). These tokens function as digital bearer instruments with 1:1 fiat redemption rights, backed by reserves of cash and treasuries. Accounting firms attest to those reserves each month (Circle) or quarter (Tether), but that is still trust in a third party, so emerging solutions like zkTLS aim to provide cryptographic proof of reserves.
- Off-chain (banks, exchanges)
- Smart contract
- Crypto asset
- Stablecoin
Fiat-backed
The issuer, such as Circle for USDC or Tether for USDT, runs a bank account of reserves, mostly cash and short-dated Treasuries, and the token contract. To mint, a verified customer wires dollars to the issuer’s bank and the issuer mints the same number of tokens to them. To redeem, the customer sends tokens back to be burned and the issuer wires the same amount of dollars from reserves.
-
Asset-backed stablecoins are created through decentralized lending protocols like Sky Protocol (formerly MakerDAO), mirroring how traditional banks create money through fractional reserve banking. While banks create most of the M2 money supply through various loans, these protocols generate stablecoins against overcollateralized onchain assets. Unlike traditional banking, asset-backed stablecoins offer superior transparency - users can audit collateral directly through the blockchain. They may also fall outside securities law scope when using purely digital collateral managed by autonomous protocols rather than intermediaries. However, adoption remains limited while these protocols mature and establish the robustness seen in traditional lending over its 110-year evolution.
Key evaluation criteria for lending protocols are: 1) Governance transparency 2) Collateral quality (ratio, volatility, liquidity) 3) Smart contract security 4) Real-time collateralization maintenance
Asset-backed
On Sky, formerly MakerDAO, you lock collateral such as ETH or wBTC in a vault worth more than you borrow, and the vault mints DAI or USDS to you as a loan. A vault that falls below its minimum collateral ratio is liquidated at auction. To close it, you repay the loan plus a stability fee; the repaid tokens are burned and your collateral is unlocked.
-
Strategy-backed synthetic dollars are dollar-denominated tokens backed by active trading strategies, and they are not true stablecoins. They function more like shares in an open-ended hedge fund, utilizing strategies like the basis trade or AVS restaking.
Key risks are: 1) Centralized, undercollateralized structure 2) Exposure to CEX risk and market volatility 3) Limited auditability of complex strategies 4) Potential for cascading DeFi failures upon depegging
Notable regulatory context: The SEC has taken enforcement action against SBSD issuers, treating them as unregistered investment products rather than stablecoins. Despite yield potential, adoption remains limited due to these concentrated risks, which exceed typical bank deposit risk profiles.
Synthetic dollars
A synthetic dollar such as Ethena’s USDe is backed by crypto collateral held with off-exchange custodians plus an equal short position in perpetual futures, so price moves cancel. To mint, a whitelisted minter deposits collateral, the protocol opens the short, and it mints synthetic dollars. To redeem, the dollars are burned, the short is closed and the collateral is returned.
I'm focusing on fiat-backed stablecoins, particularly USDC, because their regulated, monthly-attested approach and market leadership puts them in a unique position to reshape institutional finance for most of this writing.
Five Takes on Stablecoins and What They Mean
Regulator Views
- Grey wants stablecoins banned because they're unregulated bank deposits that need oversight.
- Gorton & Zhang say stablecoins can't work, won't work, and violate monetary principles.
- Massad says the US must regulate them to protect its sanctions power and can't ignore them.
- Waller says they're good for dollar dominance because 99% are USD-pegged.
- Brooks says they're key to maintaining USD reserve status and expand the dollar's reach.
There is an expanded table in the Appendix.
- GreyismBanking Traditionalist
- Gorton/ZhangFundamentally Skeptical
- MassadismPragmatic Realist
- WallerismCautiously Optimistic
- BrooksismEnthusiastically Supportive
My Takeaway
Stablecoins are now a $160B float and more than 80% of on-chain settlement. The issuers are basically private Federal Reserves. Where Circle and Tether put their reserves, and who they share the yield with, decides how much liquidity DeFi has. And the bigger stablecoins get, the harder they are to regulate, since the money moves through protocols and cross-chain bridges that nobody is in charge of.
Stablecoins are both good and bad for the dollar. They push dollarization in markets like Argentina, Turkey, and Nigeria, but they also create a "shadow Eurodollar" system that the U.S. has no oversight of. So the dollar gets bigger and harder to control. And even though everything is on-chain, tokens get locked, wrapped onto other chains, and reused as collateral in a bunch of protocols, so being able to see every transaction still won't show you where the systemic risk is.
The one I find most interesting: stablecoins work like unofficial Federal Reserve swap lines built from the bottom up. A local exchange can act as an offshore dollar bank and supply dollars in a crisis, with no official oversight. It's a parallel monetary system with its own rules, and regulators don't have a playbook for it yet.
Market Research
Stablecoins have found product market fit and are the bedrock of today’s crypto infrastructure. I’ve sung their praises, but I do not want to be so dogmatic. I’ve spent a few days reading reports from other stablecoins in the industry (full doc here) and it's not all roses and rainbows.
I've tried to come to my own conclusions about the market based on quantitative data and yet to have found anything too novel.
Tether is the biggest by market cap and also has the lowest safety score. Its reserves are opaque, it depends on a handful of banks and custodians, and its oracle and governance setup has holes. USDC is safer. It's regulated, backed by cash and Treasuries, and attested every month. If I were Circle, I'd add more banking partners and build early-warning monitoring, something like a Composite Health Index.
Historical Studies
Terra Collapse
Terra’s algorithmic UST, backed solely by its sister token LUNA, imploded and wiped ~$60B in value. Possibly driven by a quant shop shorting LUNA and arbitraging UST during the depeg.
Anchor Protocol
Anchor funneled 75% of UST’s supply by offering a 20% APY and net 121.5% APR for borrowers via token incentives (Decrypt, Forum). With deposits surging 3,826% (June 2021-May 2022) as borrowing demand collapsed, the model became unsustainable. Had borrowing stayed above 50%, Terra might’ve softened the blow.
Events
In April 2022, switching from Curve 3pool to 4pool created severe liquidity gaps. On May 7, Terraform Labs withdrew 150M UST from 3pool, triggering a coordinated attack that saw an 85M UST wormhole bridge transfer and seven key wallets-one offloading 347M UST (Chainalysis).
The collapse unfolded in three phases (May 8-13):
- ~$3B drained from Anchor pushed UST to ~$0.91 (Nansen).
- 225M UST hit centralized exchanges before trading was halted.
- The burn-mint mechanism expanded LUNA’s supply from 342M to 6.5T tokens (~8,000%+ surge).
The Luna Foundation Guard deployed 80,394 BTC in three tranches (22,189 on May 8, 30,000 on May 9, 28,205 on May 10) to defend the peg. The fallout included ₩48B in losses for 280,000 South Korean investors, an SEC lawsuit against Terraform Labs, and an Interpol Red Notice for Do Kwon. Terra’s on-chain governance lacked real-time crisis controls.
USDC vs. Terra
A sound stablecoin built from first principles mirrors USDC:
- Full fiat backing (not algorithmic)
- No synthetic yields (unlike Anchor’s 20% APY)
- Multiple banking partners (avoiding single points of failure)
- Transparent redemption processes (preventing death spirals)
Dashboard
Historical market data from CoinGecko. Coverage dates and fallback status are shown below.
Appendix
Perspectives
Greyism
Unregulated deposit taking leads to an asset-liability mismatch, which creates run risk. A run becomes a crisis, the crisis a bailout, and the bailout a burden on taxpayers. Therefore, regulate like banks now to prevent the crisis and protect taxpayers.
| Bank System Component | Grey's Concern | Market Solution | Real Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Deposit Safety | No FDIC protection. | Stablecoins impose self-backing with treasuries to reduce risk. | Tether moved to treasuries, Circle shifted from SVB exposure, PYUSD adopted a NY Trust model. |
| Oversight | No Fed oversight of stablecoin reserves. | Rating agencies and market demand increase transparency. | UST’s collapse prompted stricter models (e.g., BlackRock reserves) and new ratings by S&P, Moody’s, and Bluechip. |
| Systemic Risk | Shadow banking risks from unregulated reserves. | Many stablecoins reduce risk by holding liquid treasuries. | Fed banks’ reserves (Levine), stablecoins mimicking direct treasury holdings for stability. |
| Financial Privacy | Risks to financial privacy from private companies’ compliance. | Targeted enforcement aims to curb misuse while maintaining privacy. | DOJ sanctions (e.g., Tornado Cash), Chainalysis tracking major crimes like the $700M+ Bitfinex hack. |
| Innovation | Stablecoins need regulated banking structures to scale. | Real-world adoption integrates stablecoins into traditional systems. | MoneyGram’s Circle remittances, Visa/USDC integration, PYUSD’s trust model surpassing PayPal security. |
Gorton/Zhang
Gorton & Zhang: failing NQA leads to par value instability, which makes a poor MoE. That reduces adoption, and reliance on unstable instruments leaves systemic risk.
| NQA Component | G&Z's Theory (2021 Paper) | Reality | Evidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Historical Trust | Like failed 1830s-60s free banking (Krugman, Bullard, Warren) | US 'free banking' failed due to forced risky assets and restricted branching. | Scotland: 100+ years stable (Selgin). US failures stemmed from regulation, not free market dynamics. |
| Par Value | Can’t maintain stable value like bank notes. | Arbitrage keeps stablecoins at par. | Global markets with millions of users. |
| Due Diligence | Users must verify reserves. | Users transact without checking reserves. | Used globally as a dollar substitute. |
| Crisis Resilience | Past instability proves future failure. | Stablecoins adapted during crises, unlike banks. | Banks failed in 2023; stablecoins improved reserves. |
| Asset Quality | Like risky bank assets. | Backed by liquid Treasuries, with global users. | Regional banks are vulnerable to local risks; stablecoins diversify globally. |
Massadism
Stablecoins resemble Eurodollars: they operate offshore, which weakens US leverage and threatens sanctions enforcement. As they drive global adoption, systemic risk increases. Therefore, regulate onshore to maintain US oversight, balancing enforcement, innovation, and privacy.
| Stablecoin Component | Massad's Concern | Proposed Solution | Illustrative Examples |
|---|---|---|---|
| Resemblance to Eurodollars | Stablecoins, like Eurodollars, enable offshore dollar transactions outside the banking system. | Monitor systemic risks while recognizing structural similarities to Eurodollars. | Eurodollars grew during the Cold War due to offshore demand; stablecoins emerged after crypto debanking. |
| US Control | Stablecoins bypass US banks, reducing US enforcement leverage compared to Eurodollars. | Regulate onshore issuers to preserve oversight and enforcement capabilities. | Eurodollars clear through US banks, maintaining control; stablecoins like Tether avoid this by operating offshore. |
| Sanctions Enforcement | Illicit flows are minor but could grow with stablecoin adoption. | Develop policies that balance compliance with innovation to ensure sanctions are enforceable. | Current illicit flows are limited but could expand if unchecked (Brookings article). |
| Global Competition | Jurisdictions’ positive regulation risks sidelining US influence in stablecoin policy. | Engage globally to ensure the US remains competitive and influential in regulation. | The EU is advancing frameworks such as MiCA to promote stablecoin adoption (Brookings article). |
| Balanced Regulation | Overregulation could harm privacy and stifle US innovation. | Strike a balance between enforcement tools and protecting constitutional privacy rights. | Combining illicit activity detection with privacy protections can avoid overreach (Brookings article). |
Wallerism
Stablecoins dominate crypto transactions, and 99% are USD-pegged. That reinforces the dollar’s global role, expanding its reach through crypto-dollarization and displacing weaker fiat currencies. Therefore, leverage stablecoins to strengthen USD dominance, ensure compliance and oversight, and mitigate risks to the dollar system and domestic banking.
| Component | Market Data | Strategic Implications | Risk Factors |
|---|---|---|---|
| USD Dominance | 99% stablecoin market dollarization (Castle Island data, 2024); >80% of blockchain settlement volume (Coin Metrics, 2024) | Strong network effects favor USD-pegged products; minimal multi-currency demand (Federal Reserve speech) | Regulatory pressure for non-USD alternatives (EU MiCA Framework) |
| Global Distribution | Growing emerging market adoption; real-time treasury yield distribution (Federal Reserve speech) | Opportunity in underserved banking markets (Brookings article) | Emerging market restrictions on stablecoins (e.g., Nigeria ban on crypto exchanges). |
| Banking Integration | Direct USD distribution bypassing correspondent banking (Federal Reserve speech) | Growing institutional adoption potential | Bank disintermediation concerns (Brookings article) |
| DeFi Integration | $160B total stablecoin float (Coin Metrics data, 2024) | Core infrastructure position creates sticky demand | DeFi under increased scrutiny in the US; potential tax liabilities create adoption hurdles (Brookings article) |
| Compliance Framework | Stablecoins increasingly adopting KYC/AML frameworks to align with global compliance (Bits on Blocks) | Competitive advantage from strong compliance | Rising compliance costs (Federal Reserve speech) |
Brooksism
$160B of stablecoins, 99% USD-denominated, expand dollar dominance in digital and emerging markets. That drives crypto-dollarization (e.g., Venezuela, Nigeria) and boosts US debt demand through Treasury-backed reserves. Therefore, leverage stablecoins to reinforce USD dominance, regulate for compliance, and mitigate banking and trade risks.
| Component | Observations | Strategic Implications | Limitations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dollar Proliferation | $160B stablecoin market, 99% USD-denominated (Castle Island data) | Expands USD dominance to digital/emerging markets | Small vs sovereign Treasury holders (Japan $1.1T, China $0.85T) |
| Debt Servicing | Short-term Treasuries/repos backing creates US debt buy pressure | Reduces US debt servicing costs, eases deficit financing | Only 47 bps of US government debt; dwarfed by larger holders (Messari Mainnet talk, 2023) |
| Crypto-Dollarization | Growing in Venezuela, Argentina, Turkey, Nigeria; accessible via OTC networks and exchanges | Enables USD access bypassing local banking | Regulatory barriers (e.g., Nigeria's crypto bans) limit adoption |
| Role in Crypto Ecosystem | 70-80% of on-chain value settled (Token2049) | Primary MoE, collateral, settlement layer; new stables offer treasury yields, enhancing adoption | Future non-USD stables (e.g., Ethena) may reduce USD demand |
| Broader Dollar System | Benefits US policymakers, financial elites, sanctions enforcement | Extends US financial oversight globally | Requires trade deficits, hurting US industry (Lyn Alden) |